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Missouri Law Regarding Punitive Damages

and the
Doctrine of Remittitur
Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme TurbomecaFrance'
I. INTRODUCTION
The imposition of punitive damages can devastate defendants, be they
individuals or large corporations. Fortunately for these defendants, the jury does
not have the final word on the amount of damages. This Note addresses the
circumstances under which punitive damages are available in Missouri and when
the doctrine of remittitur will be used so that damage awards comport with
Missouri's prohibition against excessive awards and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In May of 1993, a "Life Flight" helicopter was transporting a trauma victim
from Maryville, Missouri to St. Luke's Hospital in Kansas City, Missouri.2
While airborne, the helicopter's engine stalled and the helicopter crashed near
Cameron, Missouri.3 The pilot, James Barnett, and the patient, Sherry Letz, died
in the crash.4 A flight nurse and a respiratory therapist were also on the flight,
and they both received serious injuries.5 Both Letz's family and Barnett's family
filed wrongful death actions against Turbomeca, a French designer and
manufacturer of helicopters.6 The Letz action was the first in time to receive a
verdict and both actions resulted in'verdicts for the plaintiffs. 7 The Barnett trial
was bifurcated as to compensatory and punitive damages! During the first phase
of the trial, the jury determined liability for compensatory damages, the amount
of compensatory damages, and liability for punitives.9 Only after the jury found
Turbomeca liable for punitive damages was additional evidence admitted to

1. 963 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 75 (1998).
2. Id. at 645.
3. Id.
4. Id. The autopsy on Barnett revealed that he consciously suffered pain for three
to five minutes as he bled to death. Id. at 658.
5. Id. at 645.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 667. See Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997).
8. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 645 (Mo.
Ct. App.1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 75 (1998).
9. Id. at 653.
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allow the jury to determine the amount of punitive damages.' ° The Letz trial was
not bifurcated in this way."
At trial, Turbomeca admitted that the cause of the accident was the failure
of the helicopter's nozzle guide vane.'" A nozzle guide vane channels the flow
of air between the helicopter's turbine disc blades. 3 Specifically, the vane
cracked as a result of the metal used in its construction and the design of the
engine.' 4 This cracking caused five accidents involving the same Turbomeca
model between May of 1985 and May of 1988."s At least sixteen engines were
returned to Turbomeca because of cracking in 1986 alone.'6 The flight hours of
these sixteen engines ranged from 682 to 2005. In May of 1988, Turbomeca
increased the time between overhauls for this engine from 2000 to 2500 flight
hours, thereby decreasing the possibility that the cracking problem would be
discovered prior to an in-flight engine shutdown. 7 The engine involved in the
Life Flight accident was installed in June of 1989.18 At the time of the accident
in May of 1993, the Life Flight engine had 2482 flight hours. 19
Barnett was forty years old at the time of his death and his life expectancy
was an additional thirty-five years.20 The jury awarded Bamett's family $175
million in actual damages and $175 million in punitive damages.2' These two
verdicts were remitted by the trial court to $25 million in actual damages and
$87.5 million in punitive damages. 22 The Bamett family accepted this remitted
judgment.Y By the time the trial court entered judgment, Turbomeca had also
received an adverse judgment for $70 million in the Letz action.24 Section
510.263.4 of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides in pertinent part:
Within the time for filing a motion for new trial, a defendant may file
a post-trial motion requesting the amount awarded by the jury as

10. Id. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.263 (1994) allows for trials to be bifurcated in this
manner when the issue of punitive damages is submissible and one of the parties requests
bifurcation.
11. Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 645.
12. Id.
13. Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155, 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).

14. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 645 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 75 (1998).

15. Id. at 647-49.
16. Id. at 647.
17. Id.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 645.
Id.
Id. at 645-46.

23. Id. at 646.
24. Id.
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punitive damages be credited by the court with amounts previously
paid by the defendant for punitive damages arising out of the same
conduct on which the imposition of punitive damages is based. At any
hearing, the burden on all issues relating to such a credit shall be on
the defendant and either party may introduce relevant evidence on
such motion."
The $70 million verdict in the Letz action did not distinguish between
amounts attributable to actual damages and amounts attributable to punitive
damages. 26 The plaintiffs argued that no credit under Section 510.263.4 should
be applied against their verdict because Turbomeca had not yet actually paid any
amount in the Letz action and the statutory credit applies only to amounts

"previously paid. 27 Rejecting this argument, the trial court attributed half of the
$70 million Letz judgment to punitive damages and reduced the remitted
punitive damage award in the Barnett action another $35 million.28
Turbomeca appealed several aspects of the judgment and the Barnett family
appealed only the $35 million credit. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District held that Section 510.263.4 is inapplicable when no punitive
damages have been actually paid, but previous judgments and judgments
pending on appeal must be treated as mitigating circumstances in remitting
juries' and trial courts' awards so as to not violate the Due Process Clause ofthe
Fourteenth Amendment.29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 537.090 of the 1994 Missouri Revised Statutes provides that the
trier of fact in wrongful death actions may give the injured party "such damages
as the trier of the facts may deem fair and just for the death and loss thus
occasioned. ' 30 The statute also provides that mitigating or aggravating
circumstances may also be considered.3' Whether they are termed "aggravating
circumstances" damages or punitive damages, Missouri recognizes such
damages in certain situations.32 Generally, the purpose of punitive damages is

25. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.263.4 (1994).

26. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 645 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 199 S.Ct. 75 (1998).
27. Id. at 667.
28. Id. at 667-68.
29. Id. at 669.
30. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1994).
31. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1994).
32. Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 847 (Mo. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770
(1997). Since Call v. Heard, the courts of Missouri have used the term "punitive
damages."
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to inflict punishment and to deter similar conduct.33 The jury can consider the
issue of punitive damages in wrongful death actions when the defendant could
have reasonably been charged with knowledge of a potentially dangerous
situation but did not act to prevent the danger.34
In Missouri products liability actions, there are two standards for punitive
damages, one for cases premised on negligence and one for cases premised on
strict liability.35 In a negligence products liability action, punitive damages are
allowed when there is evidence that the defendant showed complete indifference
or a conscious disregard for the safety of others. 6 This has been interpreted to
mean that the defendant must have known or had reason to know that there was
a high degree of probability that the action would result in injury. 37 In strict
products liability actions, the defendant must have exhibited complete
indifference to or a conscious disregard for the safety of others and the defendant
must have introduced
the product into commerce with actual knowledge of the
38
product's defect.
When trials are bifurcated pursuant to Section 510.263 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes, evidence of the defendant's "financial condition" is not
admissible in the initial stage unless admissible for a purpose other than punitive
damages.39 In the second stage of the trial, evidence of the defendant's "net
worth" is admissible. 40 Net worth is a discretionary factor which the jury may
or may not choose to consider.4'
In Smiley v. Cardin,4 2 the defendant argued that evidence of his financial
worth must be presented before the imposition of punitive damages. 3 The court
stated that although there was no direct evidence of the defendant's net worth,
the trial court "was made aware of defendant's large business operations and

33. Vaughan v. Taft Broad. Co., 708 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Mo. 1986).
34. Kilmer v. Browning, 806 S.W.2d 75, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). Although not
applicable to the case at hand, the standard of proof for the imposition of punitive
damages has recently changed in Missouri. Punitive damages may not be granted unless
clear and convincing proof is shown. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d
104, 111 (Mo. 1997). This standard applies to trials which begin after February 1, 1997.
Id.

35. Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-American Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 435
(Mo. 1985).
36. Stojkovic v. Weller, 802 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Mo. 1991), overruled by Rodriguez
v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W. 2d 104 (Mo. 1997).
37. Hoover's Dairy,700 S.W.2d at 436.

38. Angotti v. Celotex Corp., 812 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
39. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.263.2 (1994).
40. Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.263.3 (1994).
41. Moore v. Missouri-Nebraska Express, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 696, 713 (Mo. Ct. App.

1994).
42. 655 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).

43. Id. at 117.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/13
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could reasonably conclude that a smaller award of punitive damages would have
little deterrent effect." 44
In Gollwitzer v. Theodoro,5 the plaintiff read the defendant's gross sales
and the value of the defendant's inventory from the defendant's tax returns into
evidence.46 The court noted that the defendant's wealth and affluence can
properly be considered, but found reversible error in the evidence presented by
the plaintiff.47 Gross sales alone were inadequate because they did not show that
a profit was made, and standing alone, gross sales meant nothing. 8 The mere
value of inventory may be misleading if some of it is mortgaged.49 The court
found the plaintiff's use of such evidence to be prejudicial enough to warrant a
new trial."
In Biermann v. Gus Shaffar Ford, Inc., 1 the defendant objected to the
admission of his taxable income for the year.5 2 The court agreed that it is
possible to have a high net income yet little net worth.5 3 The court found no
error, however, because the facts of that case indicated that defendant's net
worth was three times his taxable income for that year. 4
Missouri law regarding evidence of net worth does not require that such
evidence be admitted, but if admitted, the evidence must provide an adequate
description of the defendant's net worth.
Missouri law provides that plaintiffs in wrongful death actions receive such
damages which are "fair and just for the death and loss thus occasioned."55
Section 537.090 of the Missouri Revised Statutes also states that "mitigating or
aggravating circumstances attending the death may be considered" in such
actions. 6 The appropriate remedy for an excessive verdict varies according to
the cause of the excessive verdict.5
When the verdict "is simply
disproportionate to the proof of injury and... results from an honest mistake by

the jury in assessment of the evidence," the appropriate remedy isremittitur

8

When the verdict is excessive as a result of "trial misconduct and thus results

44. Id.
45.
46.
47.
48.

675 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 112.
Id.

49. Id. The court noted that a large inventory may even show a lack of success in
business. Id.
50. Id.
51. 805 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).

52. Id. at 323-24.
53. Id. at 324.
54. Id.
55. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1994).
56. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1994).

57. Young v. Jack Boring's, Inc., 540 S.W.2d 887, 897 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
58. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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from the bias and prejudice of the jury," the prejudice can only be remedied by
a new trial.59 A trial court's reduction of a jury award through remittitur is a
ruling upon the weight of evidence and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.'
A trial court abuses its discretion when the remitted judgment
is still excessive
6
enough to shock the conscience of the appellate court. '
The doctrine of remittitur was abolished by the Missouri Supreme Court in
its 1985 decision in Firestonev. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp.,62 only to
be reinstated by the Missouri legislature in 1987.63 Section 537.068 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes provides that "[a] court may enter a remittitur order
if, after reviewing the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, the court finds
that the jury's verdict is excessive because the amount of the verdict exceeds fair
and reasonable compensation for plaintiff's injuries and damages."'
Punitive damage awards are limited by both Missouri's prohibition of
excessive verdicts and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.65
Among the factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of an
66
award under Missouri law are the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct,
the defendant's standing or intelligence,67 and the extent of the injuries
suffered.68
In PacificMutualLife InsuranceCo. v. Haslip,69 the United States Supreme
Court visited the issue of punitive damages and their relationship to due process.
In that case, the defendant argued that a punitive damage award which was four
times the compensatory damage award violated due process.7" Specifically, the
defendant argued that the award was an arbitrary deprivation of property.7' The
Supreme Court rejected a bright-line standard in favor of a reasonableness test
for constitutionality.72 "As long as [jury and trial court] discretion is exercised
within reasonable constraints, due process is satisfied."73 A later Supreme Court

59. Id.
60. Bishop v. Cummines, 870 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
61. Larabee v. Washington, 793 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), overruled
by Emery v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 S.W.2d 439 (Mo. 1998).
62. 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985).
63. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.068 (1994).
64. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.068 (1994).
65. Bennett v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 896 S.W.2d 464, 465-66 (Mo.
1995).
66. St. Joseph Belt Ry. v. Shain, 108 S.W.2d 351, 355 (Mo. 1937).
67. Moore v. Missouri-Nebraska Express., Inc., 892 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994).

68. Id.
69. 499 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1991).
70. Id. at 7.
71. Id. at 16.
72. Id. at 19.
73. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/13
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case held that punitive damage awards are also subject to procedural due process
limitations.7 4 A majority of the Supreme Court held that procedural due process
requires meaningful and adequate judicial review of punitive damage awards. 5
The Supreme Court touched on punitive damages most recently in BMW v.
Gore.76 There, a purchaser of a new BMW automobile sued BMW upon
learning that the car had undergone repairs prior to purchase.77 BMW had not
disclosed the repairs because of its nationwide policy whereby repairs were only
disclosed to the purchaser when the cost of such repairs exceeded three percent
of the purchase price. 78 The jury granted Gore four thou'sand dollars in
compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. 79 The Alabama
Supreme Court reduced the punitive award to $2 million, finding that figure
constitutionally permissible."0
The United States Supreme Court held that a punitive damage award cannot
be so "grossly excessive" when compared to the state objectives of punishment
and deterrence as to enter the "zone of arbitrariness" which violates the Due
Process Clause. Additionally, the Supreme Court gave lower courts three
specific factors to consider when reviewing punitive damage awards for due
process violations. The reviewing court must consider the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's actions, whether the punitive damages award
bears a reasonable relationship to the harm that has occurred or that is likely to
occur as a result of the defendant's actions, and the difference between this
award and civil or criminal penalties imposed in similar cases.8 '
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France,2 the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Western District held that Section 510.263.4 is inapplicable
when no punitive damages have actually been paid, but previous judgments and
judgments pending on appeal must be treated as mitigating circumstances in
remitting juries' and trial courts' awards so as to not violate the Due Process
The court initially addressed the
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
defendant's argument that the defendant was wrongly denied the right to explain

74. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994).
75. Id.
76. 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996).
77. Id. at 1593.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1593-94.
80. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 621 (Ala. 1994), rev'd,
116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
81. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598-99.
82. 963 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 75 (1998).
83. Id. at 667-69.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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bifurcation to the jury.' The court then discussed the admissibility of net worth

evidence."

Next, the court looked at the jury and trial court's verdict and

judgment,86 and finally, the court8addressed
the plaintiff's appeal regarding the
7
statutory punitive damage credit.
In response to defendant's argument that the trial court erred by not
permitting the defendant to explain the bifurcation process to the jury, the court
analyzed Section 510.263.8 The court observed that such a matter was within
the discretion of the trial court 9 and would not be disturbed absent a finding of
abuse of discretion.9" The court stated that the better practice would have been
to more fully instruct the jury as to the nature of the proceedings, 91 but because
the court was going to grant remittitur, it asserted that this did not constitute
reversible error.9 2 The court went on to describe how the jury's determination
of actual damages concurrent with the defendant's liability for punitive damages
might inflate the amount of compensatory damages. 93 Pointing out that certain
other jurisdictions allow only compensatory damage evidence in the first stage,
the court left the matter for "legislative consideration."94
Next, the court considered defendant's argument that only "net worth"
evidence, and not evidence of gross yearly sales, is admissible during the
punitive damage phase of the trial.95 The court noted that the statute governing
bifurcated trials96 mentioned evidence of defendant's "financial condition," but
also stated that evidence of defendant's "net worth" shall be admissible in the
second phase of the trial.97 Because past Missouri decisions mentioned the
"financial condition"98 and "financial status"99 of the defendant in punitive
damage cases, the court concluded that the language in Missouri's bifurcated

84. Id. at 653.
85. Id. at 654-55.
86. Id. at 655.

87. Id. at 667.
88. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.263 (1994).
89. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 654 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 75 (1998).
90. Id.
91. Id.

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id..

96. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.263 (1994).
97. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.263 (1994).
98. Moore v. Missouri-Nebraska Express, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 696, 713 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994).
99. Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 849 (Mo. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 770
(1997).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/13
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trial statute did not "make irrelevant and inadmissible any evidence of the
defendant's 'financial status' other than the net worth figure."'"
The court then considered defendant's assertion that the compensatory and
punitive damage awards were excessive and warranted remittitur under Missouri
law.' Because there was no evidence of trial misconduct, the court found that
a new trial was not warranted."0 2 To determine whether the compensatory
damage award was excessive, the court considered several factors. The court

observed that there was evidence of the decedent having experienced pain and

suffering for three to five minutes prior to his death. 3 The court also considered
the loss that decedent's family suffered in terms of income, consortium,
companionship, instruction, and comfort."° Also noteworthy was the fact that
the decedent was survived by two children in their early teens. 5 Still, the court
found $25 million in compensatory damages excessive and ordered remittitur,
finding that $3.5 million was an appropriate compensatory damage award."°
The defendant argued that the issue of punitive damages was not
submissible to the jury, and if submissible, that the award of $87.5 million
dollars was excessive."0 7 The court mentioned that punitive damages serve as an
example and deter similar conduct in others.10 8 Because the trial court heard
evidence that the defendant corporation's officers knew of the problem with the
helicopter engines,' 9 did not inform customers of the problem,"0 and extended
the number of flight hours between 2 overhauls,"' the plaintiffs made a
submissible case for punitive damages."
In determining whether remittitur of the punitive damage award was
appropriate, the court observed that there was no "punctilious prescription"' 3 or
bright-line test to determine excessiveness.' No certainty could be found in
such cases because each case "presents its own peculiar facts and circumstances

100. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 655
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 75 (1998).
101. Id. at 656.
102. Id.
103. Id.at 658.

104. Id.
105. Id.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
at 659-61.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 660.

111. Id. at 661.
112. Id. Of particular import was the fact that the defendant viewed lengthening
the amount of time between overhauls as a sales advantage. Id.

113. See Hodges v. Johnson 417 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
114. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 661
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 75 (1998).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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which must be evaluated."".5 The court observed that the jury had great latitude
in this regard, but that discretion must be tempered by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 The court looked to the three factors set out
in BMWv. Gore' " to determine whether the award violated the defendant's due
process rights."' Again, the court turned to the testimony of Turbomeca's
corporate and safety officers to determine the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct." 9 The court found ample evidence of reprehensible conduct in the fact
that Turbomeca did not report the incidents of engine failure to either the
helicopter owners or the Federal Aviation Administration. 2 ' Also reprehensible
was the fact that some incidents were reported to one customer, the French
police, but not to other customers.'' The second indicium of an excessive
punitive damage award mentioned in Gore is the ratio of punitive damages to
actual damages." Here, if the trial court's award of $87.5 million were to stand,
the relationship between the two figures would be over three to one."z Finally,
Gore dictates that the punitive damage award be compared to civil or criminal
penalties given in comparable cases.'24 Because Turbomeca's decisions were
solely based on economics and because Turbomeca had adequate notice of the
severity of the punishment that might result from their conduct, the court

concluded that 1punitive
damages were the "only real way to deter the conduct"
25

of Turbomeca.
The court then discussed Missouri's requirement that an excessive punitive
damage award be remitted.' 26 Among the factors to be considered in this inquiry
were the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, the defendant's financial status, and the character of both
parties. 127 Outrageous conduct was found in the fact that Turbomeca marketed
its helicopters for emergency medical transport, where even experienced pilots
2
could not be expected to maneuver and land a helicopter with engine trouble.' 1
Just as reprehensible was Turbomeca's lack of honesty and forthrightness with

115. Id.
116. Id. at 662.
117. 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
118. Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 662.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 663.
122. Id. at 666.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. See Moore v. Missouri-Nebraska Express, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 696, 714
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
128. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 666
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 75 (1998).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/13
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its customers. 9 Also, Turbomeca had not disclosed information to its customers
since the accident that was the subject of this cause of action. 30 Because such
objectionable conduct warranted punitive damages, but $87.5 million was
excessive under both Missouri law and due process considerations,
the court
3
remitted the punitive damage award to $26.5 million.'1
The court next considered the plaintiffs appeal regarding the statutory
credit applied to the award received in the Letz action. 32 The court stated that
the statute governing the credit133 did not envision the situation presented here:
prior punitive damages had been awarded but not yet paid, and the prior case
was up on appeal. 134 The court admitted that a strict construction of the statute
would result in no credit being applied because there had been no amounts
"previously paid" in the prior action.1 35 The court hypothesized other problems
that could arise in the implementation of the credit.' 36 For example, the
defendant may have no opportunity to apply for a credit in the first action
because no damages would have been awarded yet, but would lose the right to
such credit because it must be requested within thirty days of the entry of
judgment.137 Because a conditional credit or other exception carved into the
statutory credit scheme might result in unnecessary confusion, the court held that
total punitive damages where there are successive suits must not exceed due
process limits. 3 This can be prevented if the trial court considers previous and
pending judgments rendered
against the defendant when considering whether to
39
remit the damage award. 1
V. COMMENT

The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, in its handling of
the various issues presented in Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca

France,followed existing Missouri precedent concerning the admissibility of net
worth evidence and bifurcation of punitive damages trials. In an issue of first
impression, it resolved the problems that arise when Section 537.090 is applied
in contexts which the statute did not contemplate.

129. Id.
130. Id. at 667.
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
134. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 668
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 75 (1998).
135. Id.

136. Id.
137. 1d.
138. Id.

139. Id. at 669.
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By not finding reversible error in the trial court's disallowing the defendant
to explain the bifurcation procedure to the jury,'40 the court failed to ensure that
defendants will receive adequate procedural protections with respect to punitive
damages. If Missouri is to use the bifurcated trial procedure for punitive
damages, it should use it in an efficient manner. The jury should understand that
while they are determining liability for punitive damages, they will not
determine the appropriate amount of such damages until later in the trial. No
countervailing interest can be served by restraining defense counsel in this way.
There is no deception or prejudice which could result from the defendant
explaining the process to the jury. Especially wide discretion should be given
to defendants' counsel in products liability actions where the defendant, usually
a large manufacturer, has so much to lose in both the compensatory and punitive
damage stage. The court mentioned similar concerns for "legislative
consideration,"' 4 but the legislature would not need to act if such trial court error
were found to be reversible. The court stated that its remittitur would cure any
prejudice, but there is still the possibility that the remitted award exceeds an
award the jury might have granted had they been properly admonished regarding
the compensatory and punitive damages stages of the trial. While this may not
rise to the level of error which violates a defendant's procedural due process
rights, 41 it should nonetheless be a consideration in future cases.
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting defendant's sales
figures for the two prior years. 43 While the court was correct to point out that
evidence other than net worth is often admissible, it reaches an erroneous
conclusion to let in so much non-net worth evidence. When there is reliable
evidence of the defendant's net worth, other evidence of defendant's financial
condition should be irrelevant. Gross receipts and inventory are not indicative
of net worth and should only be admissible when there is no direct evidence of
net worth. Here, defendant disclosed its net worth, yet plaintiff was allowed to
discuss sales figures for the past two years."4
The court states that, on these facts, there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to determine that their punitive damage award would deter this type of
conduct. 45 That may be an improper way to frame the issue. Consider a case
where a massive accident has left several potential plaintiffs. The jury in an
early case may want to leave the defendant with some money in his coffers so
future plaintiffs can recover also. In this sense, reliable evidence of net worth
is needed to protect potential plaintiffs, as well as the defendant, in these actions.

140. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
141. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 654
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 75 (1998).
142. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
144. Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 654-55.
145. Id. at 655.
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Net worth evidence may sometimes be a plus for the defendant in the short-term
and beneficial to future plaintiffs in the long term.
The court clearly enunciated the standards for remittitur under both

Missouri law and the United States Constitution.!46 The court fails, however, to

give any guidance to trial courts on how much of the judgment to remit. The
court states that, for compensatory damages, $25 million is excessive and $3.5
million is more appropriate.' 47 For punitives, $87.5 million is excessive and
$26.5 million is more appropriate. 4 8 While no bright-line test can be announced
with such a fact-based determination, an acceptable ratio could be announced.
This ratio could be expressed in terms of the relationship between total
compensatory damages and economic damages. Or it could be a ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages. This would give the trial court a
benchmark for damages, and hopefully prevent every large award from being
appealed.
The court refused to carve an exception into Missouri's statutory punitive
credit, only requiring that successive awards not exceed due process
requirements. This rule will work to contravene the legislative intent evinced in
Section 510.263. The purpose of the statute was not to overly deter defendants
who had paid punitive damage judgments arising out of the same conduct. In
short, duplicative judgments bear no relation to due process analysis. 49 The

defendant may pay double awards for the same conduct, yet such awards may
not enter the "zone of arbitrariness" which violates the Due Process Clause.5
The result, therefore, will be to overly deter in cases that are brought close in
time or are on appeal at the same time, despite legislative intent to protect
defendants from multiple judgments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme TurbomecaFrance affects several areas of
Missouri law on punitive damages. While the decision remains faithful to
existing Missouri precedent, it leaves trial courts with little guidance on how the
doctrine of remittitur should be utilized. In addition, the decision delineates the
relationship between Missouri's statutory credit for previously paid punitive
damages and the judicial power of remittitur.
EDWARD S. STEVENS

146. See supra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
147. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 658
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 75 (1998).
148. Id. at 667.
149. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
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